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ABSTRACT 
 
A Capital Market Test of Representativeness. (May 2012) 
Mohammad Urfan Safdar, B.S., Haverford College; 
M.S., University of Rochester 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Anwer Ahmed 
 
While some prior studies document that investors overreact to information in 
sales growth as consistent with representativeness bias, other studies find no evidence of 
investor overreaction to either sales or earnings growth.  Other recent studies also show 
that sales growth does not predict stock returns after controlling for changes in 
outstanding shares and asset growth.  I reexamine the role of representativeness by 
investigating whether the effects of this bias are confounded by the presence of another 
effect that has been extensively documented – investors’ underreaction to fundamentals.  
Adjusting for investor under-reaction to fundamentals, I document strong evidence that 
investors overreact to sales growth as predicted under representativeness despite adding 
accruals, asset growth, and equity issuance as additional controls.  In cross-sectional 
regressions of future stock returns on predictive variables that control for fundamentals, 
changes in equity shares, accruals, and lagged 36 month returns, I find that the 
coefficient on sales growth is highly significant over both the full sample period 1970-
2009 (t-stat -3.12).  Furthermore, asset growth, equity issuance, and accruals lose much 
of their significance in favor of sales growth.  I also provide evidence that rejects a 
 iv 
theory based on fixation in favor of representativeness.  These results document 
evidence of overreaction to past sales growth in firms where underreaction to 
fundamentals does not confound the overreaction due to representativeness bias.       
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Prior studies document mixed evidence on whether representativeness bias 
affects how investors process accounting information.  While Lakonishok et al. (1994) 
document that investors overreact to information in sales growth as consistent with 
representativeness, Chan et al. (2004) find no evidence that investors overreact to either 
sales or earnings growth.  Recent studies also show that sales growth does not predict 
stock returns after controlling for changes in outstanding shares and asset growth.1  I 
reexamine the role of representativeness by investigating whether the effects of this bias 
are confounded by the presence of another effect that has been extensively documented 
in the accounting literature – investors’ underreaction to fundamentals.2  Controlling for 
investor under-reaction to fundamentals, I document strong evidence that investors 
overreact to sales growth as predicted under representativeness despite adding accruals, 
asset growth, and new shares as additional controls.   
Understanding how investors process earnings and fundamental signals is 
important in both accounting and finance for readily evident reasons.  For investors, it 
can help identify mispriced securities.  For financial professionals, it can identify 
circumstances where security prices are biased relative to their fundamentals.  This is 
especially relevant when market multiples are used to determine the values of public  
 
________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Accounting and Economics. 
                                                 
1See Daniel and Titman (2006) for equity share issuance and Cooper et al. (2008) for asset growth.   
2See Ou and Penman (1989), Lev and Thiagarajan (1992), Abarbanell Bushee (1997, 1998), and Piotroski 
(2000), for example.  
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offerings, acquisition targets, and private companies or prices are used to estimate the 
cost of capital since any bias in market prices will transmit to valuation estimates.  
Representativeness has been widely documented in psychology as an information 
processing error that has motivated studies of overreaction to financial signals in the 
stock market.3  It can cause investors to update their beliefs about stock prices in an 
exaggerated fashion upon noticing attributes they generally associate with extraordinary 
valuations.  For example, if investors observe good (bad) earnings signals, they may 
believe with too high a probability that a stock is a winner (loser) and overprice 
(underprice) the stock.   
Overstating the probabilities of extreme valuations is known as making a ‘base 
rate error.’  Barberis et al. (1998) formalize this type of error into a theory where 
investors overreact to past trends in a firm's earnings performance.  However, Chan et al. 
(2004) find that contrary to the Barberis et al. (1998) model's predictions, stocks do not 
become mispriced after long sequences of extreme earnings or sales growth.  Chan et al. 
(2004) interpret this as evidence that investors’ beliefs are not affected by 
representativeness while Daniel (2004) takes these results to mean that financial 
performance does not drive overreaction.  However, the Chan et al. (2004) study does 
not consider whether the well documented underreaction to firm specific fundamentals 
such as operating margins and operating efficiency conceals the effects of overreaction 
to sales or earnings growth.  The central thesis of this paper is that pricing errors due to 
                                                 
3See Kahneman and Tversky (1974) for a more details on representativeness and related evidence in 
psychology.  See Debondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) for empirical studies of 
overreaction.  
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representativeness can be muted by the underreaction to fundamentals which diminishes 
the predictive power of sales growth and must be taken into account to identify investor 
overreaction.  
The primary intuition underlying my empirical tests is that investors overreact to 
salient signals of financial performance such as sales or earnings growth that are widely 
followed as summary measures of growth by both analysts and other investors.  They 
may however underreact to other fundamentals such as the rate of capital investment and 
operating efficiency where information about future growth may be more difficult to 
extract.   Therefore, while investors overreact to good (or bad) financial performance 
signals, they may be underreacting to fundamentals that can be either good or bad.  
When the two types of signals agree, the net pricing error is muted rendering 
overreaction undetectable but when they diverge pricing errors are exacerbated and 
detectable.  For example, a firm may experience great revenue growth but a decline in its 
operating margins may signal a weaker competitive position.  Investors reacting to high 
revenue growth due to representativeness may overlook the latter and confer high 
valuations upon all such firms.  The valuation error in firms with high revenue growth 
and strong margins will be significantly muted because the overreaction to high revenue 
growth is offset by the underreaction to strong margins.  However, the overvaluation is 
exacerbated and likely to be detectable in firms with weak margins since underreaction 
to the latter causes further overvaluation; i.e., the errors reinforce each other.  The net 
error can appear significantly smaller when averaged across all firms with high revenue 
growth.  The interaction can be all the more severe since firms with extreme revenue are 
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also likely to exhibit other extreme fundamentals which when underweighted can have 
significant impact on the net pricing error.      
Based on the argument above, it is theoretically possible for the pricing error due 
to representativeness (overreaction) to be muted by underreaction to fundamentals.  
Using this insight, I devise empirical tests that control for underreaction to fundamental 
signals to identify the likely patterns of mispricing due to representativeness.  I measure 
direct earnings signals as the past three years' sales growth.  To measure fundamentals, I 
construct a composite measure that forecasts future earnings using changes in firms’ 
asset positions (inventories), investment activities (capital expenditures), and 
competitive strength (operating margins).  I assign each firm a quintile ranking based on 
sales growth and an independent ranking based on fundamentals.  The extreme quintiles 
are used to define the High/Low sales and Strong/Weak fundamentals portfolios.  
Pricing errors are measured using abnormal returns during the 12 months following 
portfolio formation using a four factor model based on Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997).  Interaction portfolios are formed using firms that exhibit a particular 
sales growth and fundamentals based ranking; example Low/Strong, High/Weak etc.   
I first document that future abnormal returns of firms within the High and Low 
sales growth portfolios depend upon their fundamentals.  High/Strong firms earn 
insignificant abnormal returns of 0.04% (t-stat 0.30) while High/Weak firms earn 
significant abnormal returns of -0.44% per month (t-stat -3.91).  When aggregated into a 
single portfolio of High sales growth firms, the portfolio exhibits an insignificant 
abnormal return of only -0.05% (t-stat -0.62).  Within the Low sales growth portfolio, 
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the Low/Strong firms earn 0.38% (t-stat 2.05) while the Low/Weak firms earn only 
0.08% per month (t-stat 0.54).  When combined, the Low sales growth firms earn a 
combined average of 0.22% per month (t-stat 1.88).  These figures suggest that 
underreaction to fundamentals can interact with overreaction to sales growth which 
weakens the power of sales growth to predict future returns in a sample unadjusted for 
underreaction to fundamentals, misleading the researcher into inferring an absence of 
behavioral errors caused by representativeness.   
In cross sectional regressions that control for other predictive variables including 
asset growth (Cooper et al., 2008), accruals (Sloan, 1996), lagged stock returns (Debondt 
and Thaler, 1985) and changes in outstanding shares (Daniel and Titman, 2006), sales 
growth is insignificant in predicting returns over all sample periods (t-stat of -0.84 for 
1971-2009).  To examine whether adjusting for the interactions documented above 
reveals the power of sales growth to predict returns vis-à-vis these control variables, I 
remove firms from the sample where underreaction to fundamentals offsets the 
overreaction to sales growth (e.g., high sales growth but strong fundamentals).  In cross-
sectional regressions of future stock returns on predictive variables that control for 
fundamentals, changes in equity shares, accruals, and lagged 36 month returns using this 
restricted sample, I find that the coefficient on sales growth is highly significant over the 
sample period 1971-2009 (t-stat -3.12).  Furthermore, asset growth, change in shares, 
and accruals lose much of their significance in the restricted sample.  These results 
document evidence of overreaction to past sales growth in firms where underreaction to 
fundamentals does not confound the overreaction due to representativeness bias.  Similar 
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results do not obtain when past earnings growth is used to predict future returns which 
suggests that investors treat sales as an important signal representing a firm’s potential 
growth.  I also provide evidence that rejects a theory based on fixation rather than 
representativeness.   
I also examine the effects of time series variation in investors' bias.  Cooper et al. 
(2004) show that underreaction captured by stock price momentum varies strongly with 
past market trends, suggesting that periods of optimism and pessimism impact investor 
behavior.  Therefore, I test hypotheses that state that during upward (downward) market 
trends, investors are more prone to overpricing (underpricing) stocks due to a greater 
tendency to declare winners (losers) prematurely (i.e., make extreme base rate errors) in 
a manner consistent with representativeness.  The mispricing effects discussed earlier 
become significantly larger when tests are conditioned upon the overall market trend 
measured as the past three-year return of the overall market.  Firms in the High-
Sales/Weak-Fundamentals group experience significant negative abnormal returns of -
0.79% per month following periods of positive market trends and firms in the Low-
Sales/Strong-Fundamentals group experience significant positive abnormal returns of 
1.44% per month following periods of negative market trends.  These results suggest that 
the investors' error in undervaluing (overvaluing) firms with low (high) earnings signals 
due to representativeness is more severe during up (down) markets.  These results 
survive additional tests based on liquidity risk and changes in volatility.   
 The primary contribution of this paper is that it documents evidence of 
representativeness in stock prices by jointly modeling earnings and fundamental signals, 
 7 
which is in contrast to earlier work by Barberis et al. (1998) and Chan et al. (2004).  The 
paper models these two signals to highlight circumstances under which investors' 
overreaction due to base rate errors interacts with their underreaction to fundamentals, 
leading to pricing errors that seem muted and can suggest an absence of cognitive errors.  
When the two effects are modeled jointly, significant evidence of pricing errors is 
revealed.  In the remainder of the paper, section II discusses how this paper fits into 
various strands of related literature.  Section III provides details of the analytical 
framework and hypothesis development.  Section IV discusses the research design and 
methods followed by a discussion of the major results in this paper in section V.  Section 
VI concludes. 
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II. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
This study draws upon research from three specific areas:  behavioral asset 
pricing, fundamental analysis, and return predictability.  Notable behavioral theories 
such as Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) were developed to explain 
accumulating evidence on momentum and reversal in stock returns following Debondt 
and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Whereas the Barberis et al. 
(1998) theory allows public information such as earnings to drive mispricing, the Daniel 
et al. (1998) model relies on private signals to generate similar effects.  Since concise but 
excellent reviews of this literature can now be found in several prior papers,4 the 
discussion here focuses upon studies involving representativeness specifically.   
Since Barberis et al. (1998), representativeness has found its way into formal 
asset pricing theory a handful of times.  Brav and Heaton (2002) provide a model to 
illustrate the similarity of stock price behavior under representativeness and estimation 
risk theory though their model considers only a single asset.  Rabin (2002) uses 
representativeness to illustrate what Kahenman and Tversky (1974) refer to as the law of 
small numbers.  In his model, people expect properties of the population to be reflected 
even in small samples, ignoring the law of large numbers.  The resulting bias leads to 
under-reaction rather than reversals and is similar to the conservatism effect modeled by 
Barberis et al. (1998) to explain momentum.  My study is primarily concerned with 
over-reaction due to representativeness so it does not test for momentum effects nor is it 
                                                 
4 See Chan et al. (2004) and Daniel (2004), for example. 
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a test of the Barberis et al. (1998) model.  Whereas Barberis et al. (1998) rely on patterns 
in earnings alone to model representativeness, my study relies on an alternative 
framework where investors’ overreaction to earnings signals interacts with concurrent 
underreaction to other information to generate stock return patterns. 
Empirical evidence on the role of representativeness in shaping actual stock 
prices is scarce.  Chan et al. (2004) provide the first set of comprehensive empirical tests 
of representativeness based on Barberis et al. (1998) using long term trends and 
sequences of sales and earnings growth.  They define trend by the magnitude of change 
in financial performance over a five-year period and identify a sequence of financial 
performance by the number of years over the five years during which the financial 
performance is above or below that of the median firm.  In this manner, they identify 
firms that have consistently good or bad performance over the long run.  Since they are 
unable to find cross sectional predictability in subsequent stock returns, they interpret 
this as evidence against representativeness.  Since the Chan et al. (2004) results do not 
support the Barberis et al. (1998) model of representativeness, my paper proposes a new 
set of empirical tests. 
Fundamental analysis plays an important role in this study.  Research on 
fundamental analysis in accounting has generally focused on identifying variables that 
can forecast future earnings and stock returns.  Ou and Penman (1989) construct a 
measure of fundamentals based on financial statement variables identified to be 
statistically relevant for forecasting future performance.  My measure of fundamentals is 
similar though I use a much smaller set of variables based on Lev and Thiagarajan 
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(1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997, 1998) that forecast future earnings.  Although 
the ability of these variables to forecast future returns has been documented, researchers 
have only recently begun to develop explanations for the return predictability.5  This 
paper provides evidence for the theory that representativeness causes investors to 
overlook these fundamentals by overweighting earnings signals.   
The role of earnings signals in predicting return reversals has been extensively studied in 
prior papers.  Lakonishok et al. (1994) show that sales growth is negatively related to 
future returns though they do not control for other variables that predict returns such as 
size and book-to-market.  Their results are in direct conflict with Chan et al. (2004) who 
find no relationship between either long term sales or earnings growth and future returns 
at any horizon.  More recently, Daniel and Titman (2006) show that five year sales per 
share growth is strongly negatively to future returns though they contend that the 
reversals are primarily due to intangible information and not tangible information.  
Furthermore, given that they use sales per share growth to forecast returns, they find that 
the forecasting power of sales growth is absorbed by a share issuance variable.  Their 
argument confuses causes and effects since equity issuance does not cause mispricing.  
Rather, it potentially reflects managerial response to stock mispricing that can exist for 
multiple reasons.  It is not surprising therefore that the forecasting power of sales per 
share is absorbed by such a variable.  I examine both tangible information as well as 
intangible information and find that tangible information related to sales growth exhibits 
substantial forecasting power, contrary to their results.   
                                                 
5 See Richardson et al. (2010) for recent advances in the empirical and theoretical aspects of fundamental 
analysis. 
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III. ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
III.1 Cross Sectional Analysis 
 To develop testable hypotheses, the following framework is cast.  Firms 
transition through regimes of growth, stability, and decline over time and fall into three 
basic types at any given time - winners, normal, or losers (i.e., experiencing a high-
growth phase, a stable growth phase, or a decline phase).  Investors determine the value 
of each firm by updating the posterior probability that a firm is a given type upon 
observing performance signals such as sales or earnings growth as well as other 
fundamentals.  If investors update beliefs rationally, pricing errors are random and 
cannot be predicted using either earnings or fundamental signals.  Under 
representativeness, investors commit base rate errors (i.e., overestimate the frequencies 
of winners and losers in the population) upon observing extreme earnings signals but 
underreact to other fundamentals.  As a consequence, when investors overstate the 
frequency of winners (losers), they tend to overvalue (undervalue) firms but when they 
overlook other positive (negative) information, they tend to undervalue (overvalue) the 
firm.  The undervalued firms experience positive abnormal returns in the future while 
the overvalued firms experience negative abnormal returns as prices are corrected.  
When the two effects coincide within the same firm, the overall pricing error is 
diminished and the market appears efficient if financial performance and fundamentals 
agree but exacerbated otherwise; the pricing error due to overreaction is more detectable 
in the latter case.  
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 Sloan (1996) documents that investors overlook the degree to which accruals 
(defined as the non-cash component of earnings) constitute reported earnings relative to 
cash flows.  He proposes that investors’ tend to fixate on earnings, a type of behavioral 
error that leads to overpricing (underpricing) of firms with high (low) accruals.  To 
distinguish representativeness from fixation, specify the firm’s rationally determined 
stock price as the expected value of the true but unknown price S of the firm given all 
available information (Shiller, 1981).  A rational investor who uses all information 
correctly sets the market price P as E (S|Y, X) where Y is a direct earnings signal such as 
sales growth and X is another fundamental signal.  An irrational investor who fixates on 
Y and overlooks X sets the market price as an expectation using the earnings signal only:  
P* = E(S|Y).  The pricing error of the irrational investor under fixation is defined as: 
  e* = P* - P = E(S|Y) – E(S|Y,X)     (1) 
Using iterated expectations, the expected value of the irrational pricing error conditional 
on the earnings signal Y is: 
E(e*|Y) = E[E(P|Y)|Y – E(P|Y,X)|Y] = E(P|Y) – E(P|Y)  = 0  (2) 
 
This result shows that mispricing due to fixation cannot be predicted using the earnings 
signal Y.  The intuition is that the mispricing error occurs due to an incorrect reaction to 
X, not Y. Therefore, overpricing (underpricing) occurs due to ignoring X when X 
represents bad (good) news that is ignored due to fixation.  In contrast, equation (A) does 
not describe the investors’ error under representativeness; i.e., E(e*|Y) is not equal to 
zero.  The intuition is that upon seeing an extreme positive (negative) earnings signal Y, 
the investor behaves as if this signal is representative of the entire information set and in 
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effect assumes a preponderance of good (bad) news, resulting in overpricing 
(underpricing).  Therefore, under representativeness mispricing is driven by the earnings 
signal Y and is predictable using Y even after controlling for X.   
  Based on the analysis above, we can empirically distinguish representativeness 
from fixation by regressing future returns on both the earnings signal Y and the 
fundamental X.  Under fixation, we expect the coefficient on Y to be zero especially after 
controlling for X.  Under representativeness, the coefficient is expected to be negative.  
With this analysis in hand, we can state the first null hypothesis: 
Hypothesis One:  Earnings signals do not predict future stock returns.  I.e., the 
coefficient in a regression of future returns on past earnings signals is zero.   
Hypothesis one states that overreaction to earnings signals is not detectable 
without controlling for underreaction to fundamentals.  A failure to reject hypothesis one 
indicates that either representativeness does not affect stock prices or overreaction due to 
this bias is confounded by underreaction to fundamentals.  Hypothesis two makes the 
latter possibility explicit.   
Hypothesis Two:  Controlling for underreaction to fundamentals, there is a negative 
relationship between earnings signals and future stock returns.  I.e., the coefficient in a 
regression of future returns on past earnings signals is negative in firms where 
underreaction to fundamentals does not confound overreaction to earnings signals.  
A rejection of hypothesis two serves as evidence against representativeness bias. 
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III.2 Time Series Analysis 
 Formally, representativeness as described by Kahneman and Tversky (1974) is 
an error in updating the probability that an event is of a particular type given a stimulus.6  
For example, a good earnings stimulus may cause irrational investors to infer too high a 
probability that a firm is a winner rather than a loser despite that good earnings may not 
always indicate winners.  This error is a result of neglecting base rates - i.e., overstating 
the probability of finding winners or losers in the population.  Although macroeconomic 
conditions are usually not modeled in behavioral finance theories, it is useful to examine 
whether the overall market trend influences the investors’ tendency to make systematic 
base rate errors.  Specifically, the question I address next is whether investors tend to 
overstate the probability of finding winners (losers) in the population when the overall 
stock market is doing well (poorly), leading to stock mispricing.     
To simplify, let us assume that firms are of three types as before:  winners, 
normal, and losers.  Define πω, πη, and πι as the actual distribution of winner, normal, and 
loser firms in the population.  Let πω
*, πη
*, and πι
* be the investor’s subjective 
distribution of winner, normal, and loser firms which differs from the actual distribution 
due to representativeness as follows:  when the investor overstates the frequency of 
winners (losers), then πω* > πω (πι* > πι).  To measure market trends, I define three types 
of periods based on the return performance of the overall market:  an Up-Mkt period 
during which the market return has been unusually high, a Down-Mkt period during 
                                                 
6 Kahneman and Tversky (1974) suggest that the primary way that representativeness can manifest itself is 
through insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes.   
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which the market return has been unusually low, and a Normal-Mkt otherwise.  The goal 
of the following analysis is to identify how the investor’s subjective distribution differs 
from the actual distribution of firms during Up-Mkt and Down-Mkt periods and to make 
predictions about subsequent stock returns.     
To benchmark the investor’s error during Up-Mkt and Down-Mkt periods, I 
assume that investors overstate the frequencies of both winners and losers during a 
normal market, (i.e., πω* > πω and πι* > πι) due to representativeness as illustrated in 
figure one.  I assume under the null hypothesis that the investor’s subjective distribution 
remains fixed but the actual frequency of winners (losers) increases during an Up-Mkt 
(Down-Mkt) period and decreases during a Down-Mkt (Up-Mkt) period.  Under the 
alternative hypothesis, I assume that the actual distribution remains fixed but the investor 
overstates the frequency of winners (losers) more severely during an Up-Mkt (Down-
Mkt) period.  The important intuition underlying the resulting stock return predictions is 
that whenever πω
* and πω (πι* and πι) are closer as under the null hypothesis, overpricing 
(underpricing) diminishes and whenever πω* and πω (πι* and πι) are farther apart as under 
the alternative hypothesis, overpricing (underpricing) is exacerbated.  This is because a 
greater tendency to erroneously declare winners (losers) leads to greater overpricing 
(underpricing).   
The analysis above provides the following insight:  if market trends reflect base 
rate errors, then under the null (under the alternative) the overpricing is greatest during 
Down-Mkt (Up-Mkt) periods because that is when πω* and πω diverge the most.  
Similarly, under the null (under the alternative) the underpricing is greatest during Up-
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Mkt (Down-Mkt) periods because that is when πι* and πι diverge the most.  Based on the 
cross sectional results, overpricing (underpricing) if present is more likely to be found in 
firms that exhibit High (Low) earnings growth, Weak (Strong) fundamentals, or both.  
Conditional on market trend, I predict that under the null, the greatest overpricing occurs 
in firms with High earnings growth, Weak fundamentals, or both during Down-Mkt 
periods and under the alternative, during Up-Mkt periods; such firms produce negative 
abnormal returns subsequently.  Similarly, I predict that under the null, the greatest 
underpricing occurs in firms with Low earnings or sales growth, Strong fundamentals, or 
both during Up-Mkt periods and under the alternative, during Down-Mkt periods; such 
firms produce positive abnormal returns subsequently. 
 Hypotheses 3-5 formally state the testable predictions.  In hypothesis three, I test 
for additional mispricing information contained in the market trend variable.  The 
hypothesis states that the difference in abnormal returns is largest between the most 
underpriced and the most overpriced stocks.  Under the null (alternative), this is the 
difference between the abnormal returns of the Low-Earnings stocks during the Up-Mkt 
(Down-Mkt) period and the High-Earnings stocks during the Down-Mkt (Up-Mkt) 
period.  To assess whether conditioning on the past market trend provides additional 
information, I subtract from this difference the average abnormal return of a long Low-
Earnings and short High-Earnings portfolio.  
Hypothesis Three Null:  The investor's subjective distribution of firms  {πω*, πη*, and πι*} 
remains fixed but the actual distribution of firms{πω, πη, and πι} varies as follows:  in an 
Up-Mkt period, πω,Up-Mkt > πω,Normal-Mkt and in a Down-Mkt period, πι,Down-Mkt
 
 > πι,Normal-
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Mkt.  Under these conditions, future abnormal returns conditional on earnings growth 
and past market trends exhibit the following pattern:  
[RLow Earnings/Down-Mkt  - RHigh Earnings/Up-Mkt]  -  [RLow Earnings - RHigh Earnings]  < 0 
Hypothesis Three Alternative:  The actual distribution of firms{πω, πη, and πι} remains 
fixed but the investor's subjective distribution of firms  {πω
*, πη
*, and πι
*
} varies as 
follows:  in an Up-Mkt  period, πω
*
,Up-Mkt > πω
*
,Normal-Mkt and in a Down-Mkt period, πι
*
, 
Down-Mkt
 
 > πι
*
,Normal-Mkt.  Under these conditions, future abnormal returns conditional on 
earning growth and past market trends exhibit the following pattern:  
 [RLow Earnings/Down-Mkt  - RHigh Earnings/Up-Mkt]  -  [RLow Earnings - RHigh Earnings] > 0  
Hypothesis four states that under the null (alternative), the difference is greatest 
between the abnormal returns of the Strong-Fundamentals stocks during the Up-Mkt 
(Down-Mkt) period and the Weak-Fundamentals stocks during the Down-Mkt (Up-Mkt) 
period.  To assess whether conditioning on the past market trend provides additional 
information, I subtract from this difference the average abnormal return of a long 
Strong-Fundamentals and short Weak- Fundamentals based portfolio. 
Hypothesis Four Null:  The investor's subjective distribution of firms  {πω*, πη*, and πι*} 
remains fixed but the actual distribution of firms{πω, πη, and πι} varies as follows:  in an 
Up-Mkt period, πω,Up-Mkt > πω,Normal-Mkt and in a Down-Mkt period, πι,Down-Mkt
 
 > πι,Normal-
Mkt.  Under these conditions, future abnormal returns conditional on fundamental 
strength and past market trends exhibit the following pattern:  
 [RStrong Fund. /Down-Mkt - RWeak Fund. /Up-Mkt] -  [RStrong Fund. - RWeak Fund.]  < 0  
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Hypothesis Four Alternative:  The actual distribution of firms{πω, πη, and πι} remains 
fixed but the investor's subjective distribution of firms  {πω
*, πη
*, and πι
*
} varies as 
follows:  in an Up-Mkt period, πω
*
,Up-Mkt > πω
*
,Normal-Mkt and in a Down-Mkt period, πι
*
, 
Down-Mkt
 
 > πι
*
,Normal-Mkt.  Under these conditions, future abnormal returns conditional on 
fundamental strength and past market trends exhibit the following pattern:   
[RStrong Fund./Down-Mkt - RWeak Fund./Up-Mkt] -  [RStrong Fund. - RWeak Fund.]  > 0 
Hypothesis five states that under the null (alternative), the difference is greatest 
between the abnormal returns of the Low-Earnings/Strong-fundamentals stocks during 
the Up-Mkt (Down-Mkt) period and the High-Earnings/Weak fundamentals stocks 
during the Down-Mkt (Up-Mkt) period.  To assess whether conditioning on the past 
market trend provides additional information, I subtract from this difference the average 
abnormal return of a long Low-Earnings/Strong-Fundamentals and short High-
Earnings/Weak-Fundamentals based portfolio. 
Hypothesis Five Null:  The investor's subjective distribution of firms  {πω*, πη*, and πι*} 
remains fixed but the actual distribution of firms{πω, πη, and πι} varies as follows:  in an 
Up-Mkt period, πω,Up-Mkt > πω,Normal-Mkt and in a Down-Mkt period, πι,Down-Mkt
 
 > πι,Normal-
Mkt.  Under these conditions, abnormal returns conditional on earnings signals, 
fundamental strength and past market trends exhibit the following pattern:  
 [RLow Earnings/Strong Fund. /Down-Mkt – RHigh Earnings/Weak Fund. /Up-Mkt]   - 
    [RLow Earnings/Strong Fund. – RHigh Earnings/Weak Fund.]    < 0  
Hypothesis Five Alternative:  The actual distribution of firms{πω, πη, and πι} remains 
fixed but the investor's subjective distribution of firms  {πω
*, πη
*, and πι
*
} varies as 
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follows:  in an Up-Mkt period, πω
*
,Up-Mkt > πω
*
,Normal-Mkt and in a Down-Mkt period, πι
*
, 
Down-Mkt
 
 > πι
*
,Normal-Mkt.  Under these conditions, abnormal returns conditional on 
earnings signals, fundamental strength and past market trends exhibit the following 
pattern:   
[RLow Earnings/Strong Fund./Down-Mkt – RHigh Earnings/Weak Fund. /Up-Mkt]   -  
  [RLow Earnings/Strong Fund. – RHigh Earnings/Weak Fund.]   > 0 
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
IV.1 A Composite Fundamental Strength Proxy 
The empirical tests examine whether abnormal stock returns follow the patterns 
described in hypotheses 1-7.  To obtain variation across both the observed earnings 
performance as well as fundamental strength, I create 5x5 (25 total) portfolios of firms 
based on independent sorts using sales growth and a measure for the strength of a firm's 
business fundamentals.  Throughout this paper, earnings growth and sales growth for 
each firm are calculated every year over the previous three-year period using the 
following formulas: 
             = (Ei,t - Ei,t-3)/Ai,t-3                      (3) 
             = (Si,t - Si,t-3)/Ai,t-3     (4) 
where Ei,t and Si,t are firm i's reported net income without adjustments and net sales in 
year t and Ai,t-3 are total assets reported in year t-3. 
I use several financial statement variables that have the potential to inform 
investors about the strength of a firm's investment opportunities and profitability.  Prior 
research has found that these variables are associated with future earnings growth 
beyond information that is contained in current earnings growth (see Lev and 
Thiagarajan,1992).  The variables used in this study include changes in inventory (INV), 
accounts receivable (AR), capital expenditures (CAPX), gross margin (GM), selling and 
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administrative expenses (SGA), effective tax rate and (ETR).  I refer the reader to 
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) for further exposition.7       
To develop a composite measure of fundamental strength, at December end of 
each year I obtain the variables described above for each firm in the cross section from 
Compustat files and perform the following cross sectional regression:8 
             ∑                              (5) 
where       is firm i's one year earnings growth and          are the financial statement 
data described above for firm i available at the end of year t-1.  Given the estimates  ̂  
and the values of fundamentals        for firm i at the end of year t, I estimate the 
composite measure of fundamental strength  ̂    as: 
    ̂      ̂   ∑  ̂                     (6) 
The proxy above provides an estimate of next year's earnings growth predicted by the 
most recently available information about the variables described above.  The estimated 
coefficients  ̂  from equation (5) are averaged over the past four years before being used 
in equation (6).  
IV.2 Portfolio Formation 
The earnings signals in this paper are measured as either three-year earnings 
growth or sales growth.  To create the portfolios, at each December year-end t I rank all 
available firms in the cross section into five categories based on the magnitude of their 
total earnings growth or sales growth.  The extreme and normal earnings growth 
                                                 
7 I drop variables used in Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) that lead to substantial reductions in the data.   
8 For firms that have a non-December fiscal year-end, I use quarterly statements to obtain financial 
statement data for the trailing 12-month period ending closest to end of December. 
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categories are defined as:  Rank 5 (HIGH, highest earnings or sales growth), Rank 3 
(MEDIUM, normal growth), and Rank 1 (LOW, greatest decline).  I limit the 
measurement interval for available information to three years because as the 
measurement interval becomes longer, the mispricing effects diminish since earnings 
and fundamentals signals are unlikely to diverge over long periods.   
Since the intent is to use fundamental information that is incremental to the 
information already available in contemporaneous earnings signals, I estimate an annual 
cross sectional least squares regression using information available at December end of 
year t:      
  ̂                                     ̂       (7) 
where  ̂    represents the composite fundamental strength proxy estimated in equation 
(3),           and           represent the past three year earnings growth and sales growth, 
and  ̂    represents the information in  ̂    that is orthogonal to the contemporaneous 
earnings signals.  To form portfolios based on  ̂    I independently rank all firms at time t 
into quintiles based on  ̂    and specify rank 5 as STRONG (fundamentals) and Rank 1 
as WEAK.    
 Having formed portfolios based on univariate sorts, I intersect each earnings (or 
sales growth) category with each fundamentals based category to form portfolios based 
on joint rankings.  For example, firms that are in both the HIGH earnings growth 
category as well as in the independently sorted STRONG fundamentals category are 
organized into a {High/Strong} portfolio, and so forth.   
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IV.3 Estimating Abnormal Returns 
 To track the abnormal return performance of each portfolio, I use monthly stock 
returns from CRSP files to compute equally weighted returns to each 
                  ̂     based portfolio formed at December end of year t.  I add delisting 
returns where available as the last available monthly return for each stock.  The portfolio 
returns are computed for each of the next 12 months starting in April of year t+1.  The 
procedure is repeated each year and the annual sequences of monthly portfolio returns is 
linked together from one year to the next to create a time series of portfolio returns for 
each portfolio.  For portfolio based tests, I perform 4-factor excess return regressions for 
each portfolio of firms to estimate abnormal returns as regression alphas.  Factor returns 
and risk free returns are obtained from WRDS files: 
       Rpt - rf = αp + βmkt(Rmkt-rf) + βSMB(RSMB) + βHML(RHML) + βUMD(RUMD) + ept (8)  
where Rpt is the monthly portfolio return, rf is the one month risk free return, Rmkt is the 
market return, RSMB is the return on a size-based factor portfolio, RHML is the return on a 
value-based factor portfolio, and RUMD is the return on a momentum-based factor 
portfolio.  The estimated alpha (αp) reflects the average monthly return that is 
unexplained by exposures to these factors.       
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
V.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 The overall sample of firms is constructed using the intersection of Compustat 
and CRSP databases over the time period 1962-2009.  An average of 1,658 firms are 
available per year that meet all the financial statement and stock return data 
requirements.  All financial statement based variables are Winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels.  For stock return based analysis, returns are Winsorized at the 0.5% and 99.5% 
level to diminish the influence of extreme returns from some microcap stocks.  Results 
are also duplicated without Winsorizing the stock returns.  Table 1 reports pooled 
sample means for the {High/Strong}, {High/Weak}, {Medium/Strong}, 
{Medium/Weak}, {Low/Strong}, and {Low/Weak} portfolios formed based on annual, 
5x5 sorts using the past three-year sales growth (scaled by lagged total assets) and the 
fundamental strength measure  ̂    estimated using equation (6).  The latter measures the 
predicted income growth for year t+1 given information about fundamentals at the end 
of year t.  The descriptive statistics reveal that the firms in the reported categories exhibit 
extreme characteristics on the intended dimensions – i.e., growth and fundamentals.  
Firms in the highest sales growth categories are younger with a mean age around 10 
years while firms in the low sales growth categories are comparatively older with a mean 
age around 16 years.  An examination of the past asset growth and sales growth 
illustrates that firms with strong fundamentals grow more efficiently since they achieve 
similar or higher sales growth with a lower level of investment compared to firms with
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics  (Sample: 1962-2009) 
 
Sales Fundamentals Age  ̂    Mkt Val Asset Income Sales Mkt/Book Average  
Growth Strength (Years) 
 
Decile Growth Growth Growth 
 
Firms 
High Strong 9.9 2.5% 4.8 323% -9.4% 347% 2.95 89 
            
High Weak 9.5 -3.6% 4.7 326% -5.8% 273% 3.34 83 
            
Medium Strong 15.7 2.2% 4.8 33.3% -5.4% 31.6% 1.97 42 
            
Medium Weak 15.9 -2.6% 5.0 44.3% 0.7% 31.8% 2.37 54 
            
Low Strong 15.7 2.5% 3.4 -10.3% -8.5% -35.0% 1.83 62 
            
Low Weak 15.9 -2.8% 3.6 4.4% -3.3% -35.3% 2.17 54 
            
Full Sample 13.1 -0.3% 5.1 151% -5.8% 134% 2.54 1,658 
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weak fundamentals.  Firms in the high sales categories are of average size with a mean 
market value decile of 4.75 while firms in the low sales categories are smaller with a 
mean market value decile of 3.5.  The market value deciles are measured at the end of 
the year and are updated annually for these calculations.  Firms in the strong 
fundamentals categories exhibit positive expected income growth while firms in the 
weak categories exhibit negative expected income growth.  To examine the ability of  ̂    
to predict future earnings growth, I estimate the following panel regression : 
           = Intercept + β1 ̂    + β2          + β3          + ei,t        (9) 
where           and           are three year net income and sales growth in year t for firm 
i, scaled by lagged assets.  The regression finds a strong positive relation between  ̂    
and one year ahead earnings growth           with a t-stat of 12.93.   
V.2 Interaction Between Pricing Errors 
 I first document evidence of interaction between underreaction to fundamentals 
and overreaction to sales growth.  Table 2 reports the average monthly abnormal returns 
of portfolios constructed based on either past 3-year sales growth or fundamentals as 
well as based on both characteristics.  The abnormal returns are measured using 
regression intercepts (alpha, henceforth) from the 4-factor excess return regression 
model in equation (5).  Results for sales based portfolios show a notable asymmetry:  the 
low sales growth firms generate a positive alpha of 0.22% per month (t-stat: 1.88) 
whereas the high sales growth firms experience no predictable price reversals (alpha: -
0.05%, t-stat: -0.62).  A similar asymmetry is observable in the fundamentals based 
portfolios:  firms with strong fundamentals show a monthly alpha of 0.27% (t-stat: 3.76) 
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Table 2 
Mean Abnormal Returns to Portfolios Based on Quintiles of Past 3-Year Sales Growth and Fundamental Strength   ̂     
(Sample: 1962-2009) 
   
 
3 Year Sales Growth  
 
 
 
 ̂
 
  Low High Low-High 
     
  0.22% -0.05% 0.27% 
  (1.88) (-0.62) (2.86) 
     
Strong 0.27% 0.38% 0.04% 0.34% 
 (3.76) (2.05) (0.30) (2.03) 
     
Normal 0.25% 0.20% 0.08% 0.12% 
 (4.08) (1.63) (0.74) (0.85) 
     
Weak -0.15% 0.08% -0.44% 0.53% 
 (-1.74) (0.54) (-3.91) (3.92) 
     
Strong-Weak 0.42% 0.30% 0.48%  
 (5.69) (1.97) (4.17)  
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but firms with weak fundamentals exhibit somewhat insignificant abnormal returns 
(alpha:  -0.15%, t-stat: -1.74).  
Prima facie, these observations suggest that weak fundamentals are not ignored 
and no overreaction to high sales growth exists.  However, table 2 also reveals evidence 
of substantial interaction between underreaction and overreaction.  In firms with strong 
fundamentals, the high sales growth portfolio exhibits an insignificant alpha of 0.04% (t-
stat 0.30) and in firms with weak fundamentals, the low sales growth portfolio exhibits 
an alpha of 0.08% per month (t-stat 0.54).  These results are especially strong evidence 
of interaction between overreaction to sales growth and underreaction to fundamentals 
since neither the high sales firms nor the weak-fundamentals firms exhibit significant 
abnormal returns based on univariate sorts alone.  Most notably however, the  
overreaction to low (high) sales growth is evident only in firms with strong (weak) 
fundamentals (alpha 0.38%, t-stat 2.05 for low/strong firms and alpha -0.44%, t-stat -
3.91 for high/weak firms).  Collectively, these results suggest that overreaction to sales 
growth if present is potentially masked by investors’ underreaction to other 
fundamentals.  However, they do not by themselves reject or support the presence of 
representativeness bias in the absence of control variables that may further diminish the 
forecasting power of sales growth.     
V.3 Sales Growth and Other Variables  
In this section, I test hypotheses one and two using cross sectional regressions to 
determine whether investors overreact to sales growth.  Hypothesis one states that the 
coefficient in a regression of future returns on past sales growth is zero.  Each month 
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beginning in April of year t+1 to March of year t+2, I perform Fama-MacBeth9 type 
cross-sectional regressions of monthly firm returns on the past 3-year sales growth 
         , earnings growth            fundamentals measure  ̂    and several control 
variables including total accruals (Sloan, 1996), one year asset growth (Cooper et al., 
2008), and change in shares outstanding (Daniel and Titman, 2006) observed at the end 
of year t.  Each of these control variables have been shown to predict future stock 
returns.  I also include logs of market value of equity (MV) and the book-to-market 
value of equity ratio (BM) as additional controls.  To test hypothesis one, regressions are 
performed using the full sample.   
 Table 3 shows the time series mean of regression coefficients and test-statistics 
estimated using 465 cross sectional regressions for the full sample; i.e., without adjusting 
the sample for underreaction to fundamentals.  In model 1 with only MV and BM used 
as controls, the coefficient on sales growth is significantly negative (t-stat -2.99) while 
the coefficient on fundamentals is significantly positive (t-stat 4.62).  Based on the 
analysis in section III.1, under fixation we expect a positive coefficient on the 
fundamentals measure but zero on sales growth. The strongly significant negative 
coefficient on sales growth is evidence of overreaction to sales growth due to 
representativeness rather than fixation.  In model 2, including total accruals as an 
additional control per Sloan (1996) diminishes the forecasting power of sales growth but 
the coefficient remains significantly negative (t-stat -2.35).  The results of models 1 and 
2 discount the possibility of a fixation based explanation for the forecasting power of  
                                                 
9 See Fama and Macbeth (1973). 
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Table 3 
Fama-Macbeth Regressions of Monthly Stock Returns on Predictive Variables   (Sample: 1971-2009) 
 
Model 
Dependent 
Variable 
                               Ri,t,t-3        BMt MVt  ̂    
Avg.  
Firms 
Months 
 
 
          
1 Ret -0.08     0.28 -0.03 9.10 1,748 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-2.99)     (4.01) (-0.72) (4.62)   
            
2 Ret -0.06    -1.01 0.33 -0.03 6.94 1,197 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-2.35)    (-3.92) (4.44) (-0.68) (3.26)   
            
3 Ret -0.03 -0.36   -0.90 0.31 -0.03 4.31 1,196 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-1.14) (-2.84)   (-3.37) (4.29) (-0.59) (1.97)   
 
 
          
4 Ret -0.02 -0.34 -0.06  -0.92 0.30 -0.02 4.38 1,183 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-0.77) (-2.67) (-2.77)  (-3.43) (4.07) (-0.50) (1.99)   
 
          
5 Ret -0.03 -0.41 -0.12 0.0001 -1.09 0.28 -0.03 3.67 1,047 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-0.84) (-3.22) (-3.53) (0.15) (-3.91) (3.84) (-0.62) (1.54)   
            
6 Ret -0.07 -0.39 -0.16 0.002 -1.33 0.33 -0.01 3.52 950 237 
T-stat (1971-1990) (-1.60) (-1.87) (-3.36) (2.05) (-3.40) (3.75) (-0.17) (0.81)   
            
7 Ret 0.02 -0.42 -0.08 -0.002 -0.84 0.23 -0.05 3.83 1,148 228 
T-stat (1991-2009) (0.59) (-3.10) (-1.62) (-1.86) (-2.11) (1.95) (-0.65) (2.10)   
            
8 
Ret 
(Price > $5) -0.01 -0.36 -0.11 0.0004 -1.48 0.19 -0.03 6.56 843 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-0.43) (-2.61) (-2.97) (0.67) (-4.57) (2.37) (-0.78) (2.31)   
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sales growth.  However, Cooper et al. (2008) show that one year asset growth 
significantly reduces the forecasting power of sales growth.  Furthermore, Daniel and 
Titman (2006) examine whether return reversals such as those documented in Debondt 
and Thaler (1985) can be explained by sales growth and find that equity issuance factors 
absorb the forecasting power of sales growth.  In models 3-5, I include asset growth, the 
change in total shares outstanding over the past three years, and the lagged 36 month 
stock return as additional controls.  Controlling for these variables makes the coefficient 
on sales growth in model 5 insignificant (t-stat -0.84) while asset growth, the change in 
shares, and accruals remain highly significant as in prior studies with t-stats of -3.22, -
3.53, and -3.91, respectively.  In the 1971-1990 and 1991-2009 subperiods (models 6 
and 7), the coefficient on sales growth is statistically insignificant with t-stats of -1.60 
and 0.59, respectively.  In model 8, the sample is restricted to firms with share prices 
greater than $5 per share.  Using the full set of control variables, the coefficient on sales 
growth remains insignificant (t-stat -0.43) while asset growth, change in shares 
outstanding and accruals remain highly significant.  Based on these results, we are 
unable to reject the null that there is no overreaction to sales growth as stated in 
hypothesis one once we add other control variables.   
 To test whether controlling for the underreaction to fundamentals can reveal the 
presence of overreaction due to representativeness as stated in hypothesis 2, I restrict the 
sample to firms where underreaction to fundamentals is least likely to offset the 
overreaction.  To accomplish this, I remove firms that are in sales growth quintiles 1 and 
2 but fundamentals based quintiles 1-4.  Similarly I remove firms with sales growth  
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Table 4 
Regressions for Restricted Sample (Adjusted for Interaction Between Sales Growth and Fundamentals)   (Sample: 1971-2009) 
 
Model 
Depend. 
Variable 
                                         Ri,t,t-3        BMt MVt  ̂    Firms Months 
1 Ret -0.18      0.28 -0.03 6.04 640 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-3.82)      (3.32) (-0.72) (1.73)   
 
 
 
          
2 Ret -0.16     -0.91 0.30 -0.03 4.99 448 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-3.22)     (-2.35) (3.24) (-0.67) (1.42)   
 
 
 
          
3 Ret -0.19 0.75    -1.06 0.30 -0.04 5.27 447 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-3.65) (2.70)    (-2.78) (3.29) (-0.81) (1.50)   
 
 
          
4 Ret -0.16 0.80 -0.36   -0.95 0.28 -0.04 2.08 446 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-2.94) (2.87) (-2.14)   (-2.31) (3.18) (-0.75) (0.56)   
             
5 Ret -0.15 0.85 -0.34 -0.08  -0.94 0.26 -0.03 2.39 441 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-2.83) (3.03) (-1.99) (-2.18)  (-2.27) (2.91) (-0.69) (0.64)   
             
6 Ret -0.21 1.00 -0.31 -0.10 -0.0003 -0.89 0.23 -0.04 1.62 389 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-3.12) (2.81) (-1.75) (-1.88) (-0.40 (-2.06) (2.37) (-0.89) (0.44)   
             
7 Ret -0.20 1.63 -0.33 -0.17 0.002 -1.19 0.33 -0.02 -1.18 337 237 
T-stat (1971-1990) (-1.91) (2.48) (-1.10) (-2.38) (1.48 (-1.97) (2.85) (-0.29) (-0.18)   
             
8 Ret -0.22 0.35 -0.29 -0.02 -0.002 -0.58 0.12 -0.07 4.53 443 228 
T-stat (1991-2009) (-2.61) (1.43) (-1.60) (-0.26) (-2.31 (-0.93) (0.78) (-0.88) (1.65)   
             
9 
Ret 
(Price > $5) -0.21 0.77 -0.17 -0.06 0.0003 -1.35 0.11 -0.08 8.69 308 465 
T-stat (1971-2009) (-2.61) (2.00) (-0.88) (-1.04) (0.47 (-2.54) (1.14) (-1.71) (1.96)   
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quintiles 4 and 5 but fundamentals based quintiles of 2-5.  The goal of this technique is 
to restrict the sample to firms where fundamentals are least likely to confound the 
pricing error due to overreaction.  These filters reduce the sample size by about 65% to 
399 firms on average.  Table 4 shows time series means and t-stats from Fama-Macbeth 
type regressions using this restricted sample while controlling for fundamentals to ensure 
that the filters do not induce a spurious correlation between returns and sales growth via 
fundamentals.  As in table 3, models 1 and 2 show significantly negative coefficients on 
sales growth (t-stats -3.82 and -3.22, respectively) despite including fundamentals and 
accruals as controls.  In model 3, I include the past 3-year earnings growth as an 
additional variable to detect any overreaction to earningsgrowth.  However, the 
coefficient on earnings growth is strongly positive with a t-stat of 2.70 while sales 
growth remains significantly negative with a t-stat of -3.65.   
In models 4-6, I discover that in contrast to table 3, the coefficient on sales 
growth remains significantly negative despite the addition of asset growth, equity 
issuance, accruals, and the lagged 36-month stock return as controls.  In model 6, the 
coefficient on sales growth is significantly negative with a t-stat of -3.12 while asset 
growth, change in shares, and accruals are considerably less significant with t-stats of -
1.75, -1.88, and -2.06, respectively.  The fundamentals measure exhibits an insignificant 
positive coefficient with a t-stat of 0.44 demonstrating that in this restricted sample, sales 
growth drives the mispricing rather than fundamentals.  The coefficient on sales growth 
is highly significant during the 1991-2009 subperiod (model 8) with a t-stat of -2.61 
while it is somewhat less significant for the 1971-1990 subperiod (model 7) with a t-stat 
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of -1.91.  In model 9, I remove stocks with prices below $5 per share from the restricted 
sample since Fama and French (2008) note that many asset pricing anomalies can be 
located to microcap stocks which make up a minor fraction of the total market.  The 
coefficient on sales growth remains significantly negative with a t-stat of -2.61 in this 
sample as well.  These results strongly suggest that long term revenue growth is a 
powerful predictor of future stock returns due to overreaction to sales growth in firms 
where underreaction to fundamentals does not mute the overreaction.  
V.4 Tests of Hypotheses 3-5 
Hypothesis three predicts a role for time series variation in representativeness, 
i.e. the severity of base rate errors made by investors (i.e., overestimating the frequency 
of winners vs. overestimating the frequency of losers in the population) under different 
market conditions.  If representativeness varies over time, it is reasonable to expect that 
investors are more prone to overestimate the frequency of winners (losers) when the 
overall market trend is positive (negative).  To test hypothesis three, I compute the 
market return for the past 36 months for each year in the full sample (1962-2009).  Each 
36-month period is then ranked into quintiles based on the magnitude of the return.  
Quintile 5 - the highest returns - represent a positive market trend while quintile 1 - the 
lowest returns - represent a negative market trend with the remaining periods identified 
as a 'normal' market.   
 To perform tests of hypothesis three, I create dummy variables Up-mkt and 
Down-mkt that take on the value of 1 during the 12 months (April of year t+1 to March 
of year t+2) following periods ranked in quintiles 5 and 1 of market returns, respectively, 
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and 0 otherwise.  To estimate abnormal returns, equation (8) is modified to include these 
dummy variables: 
 Rpt - rf = αp,Normal + βUp-mkt Up-mkt + βDown-mkt Down-mkt + βmkt(Rmkt-rf) +  
  [βSMB(RSMB) + βHML(RHML) + βUMD(RUMD)] + ept          (10) 
The alphas conditional on the recent market trend are estimated as: 
 Post-Normal Market alpha   αNormal = αp,Normal   (11) 
 Post-Up-mkt alpha    αUp-mkt = αp,Normal + βUp-mkt  (12) 
 Post-Down-mkt alpha   αDown-mkt  = αp + βDown-mkt  (13) 
 Table 5 reports estimates of abnormal returns from the multifactor model using 
equations (11)-(13) based on sales growth and fundamental strength individually under 
different market trends.10  As predicted by hypothesis three (alternative), the difference 
in the abnormal returns of firms with low sales growth following a Down-Mkt period 
and firms with high sales growth following an Up-Mkt period exceeds the difference in 
average abnormal returns of firms with low vs. high sales growth by 0.5% per month (F-
test p-value of 5.65% using a 4-factor model to estimate abnormal returns).  This result 
provides some support to the alternative in hypothesis three that the overall market trend 
has significant explanatory power in identifying investors' base rate errors.  The results 
suggest that investors are more prone to overestimating the frequency of losers (winners) 
when the overall market trend has been negative (positive).  The evidence is weaker 
when I use earnings growth as the earnings performance signal instead of sales growth 
(F-test p-value of 13.12%, not shown).   
                                                 
10 Results using CAPM regressions are stronger and more significant in nearly every case. 
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Table 5 
Mean Abnormal Returns to Portfolios Based on Quintiles of Past 3-Year Sales Growth and Fundamental Strength   ̂    
Conditional on Market Trends (Sample: 1962-2009)   
 
Portfolio Months αUp-mkt αDown-mkt 
 
     
  Sales Growth Tests of Hypothesis 3 
       
RLow 525 0.36% 0.76% [RLow Earnings,DOWNMKT  - RHigh Earnings,UPMKT]  - 
[RLow Earnings - RHigh Earnings] = 0.50% T-stat  1.34 2.52 
    
F-Test P-Value    =    5.65% 
RHigh 525 -0.17% 0.47% 
T-stat  -0.92 2.49 
 
    
  Fundamental Strength Test of Hypothesis 4 
      
RStrong 525 0.47% 0.94% [RStrong Fund.,DOWNMKT - RWeak Fund.,UPMKT] - 
[RStrong Fund. - RWeak Fund.] = 0.67% T-stat  1.90 3.74 
    
F-Test P-Value    =    2.32% 
RWeak 525 -0.23% 0.18% 
T-stat  -1.18 0.92  
     
  Sales Growth/Fundamental Strength Test of Hypothesis 5 
      
RLow/Strong 525 0.83% 1.44% [RLow Sales/Strong Fund./Down-mkt - RHigh Sales/Weak Fund./Up-Mkt] - [RLow Sales/Strong Fund. - 
RHigh Sales/Weak Fund.] = 1.11% T-stat  1.89 3.21 
     
RHigh/Weak 525 -0.79% 0.05% F-Test P-Value    =    4.92% 
T-stat  -3.08 0.19  
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 As predicted under the alternative in hypothesis four, the difference in the 
abnormal returns of firms with strong fundamentals following a Down-Mkt period and 
firms with weak fundamentals following an Up-Mkt period exceeds the difference in 
average abnormal returns of firms with strong vs. weak fundamentals (F-test p-value of 
2.32% using the 4-factor model).  Again, this result suggests that the overall market 
trend plays a role in determining the impact of ignoring fundamentals on stock prices.  
For example, investors are more likely to ignore strong (weak) fundamentals when the 
overall market trend has been negative (positive).   
 Hypothesis five makes predictions about stock return performance conditional on 
earnings performance, fundamental strength, and past market trends.  Table 5 provides 
estimated abnormal returns from equations (12a)-(12c) for portfolios formed jointly on 
past three year sales growth and fundamental strength.11  The results provide substantial 
support for the alternative in hypothesis five.  The High/Weak and Low/Strong 
portfolios experience average abnormal returns of -0.79% per month (4-factor alpha, p-
value < 1%) and 1.44% per month (p-value < 1%) following Up-Mkt and Down-Mkt 
periods, respectively.  The difference in these returns exceeds the abnormal returns of a 
portfolio long in the Low/Strong and short in High/Weak stocks by 1.11% per month (4-
factor p-value < 5%).  Collectively, these results in table 5 lend strong support to the 
hypothesis that time series variation in how investors ignore base rates are important in 
locating evidence of mispricing due to representativeness.  The results suggest that 
during positive market trends, investors overestimate the frequency of winners and 
                                                 
11 Results using CAPM regressions are stronger and more significant in nearly every case.   
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underweight weak fundamentals and during negative market trends, they overestimate 
the frequency of losers while underweighting strong fundamentals.  Overall, the 
evidence supports the influence of representativeness on the time series of stock returns. 
Although the market factor in equation (10) should account for any market 
related reversals in returns, I nevertheless examine average market returns following Up-
Mkt and Down-Mkt periods to see if returns reverse for the broader market portfolio.  
There is no evidence that such reversals exist.  Table 6 shows that the average market 
return following Up-Mkt periods is 0.86% per month compared to 0.96% per month 
following Down-Mkt periods.  An F-test for the difference in these average returns has a 
p-value of 87.5%, indicating that market returns are substantially similar following both 
periods.               
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Table 6 
Average Monthly Returns to Market, SMB, HML, and UMD portfolios Conditional on Market Trends (Sample: 1962-2009) 
    
  Post-Upmkt F-Stat   Post-Downmkt F-Stat DOWNMKT-UPMKT 
  Avg. Ret P-Value   Avg. Ret P-Value F-Stat P-Value 
                  
         
Mkt Return 0.86% 3.9%   0.96% 3.9%   87.50%   
                  
                  
SMB -0.14% 63.2%   0.82% 2.5%   4.65%   
                  
                  
HML 0.76% 0.4%   0.91% 0.2%   71.15%   
                  
                  
UMD 0.65% 10.0%   -0.23% 62.1%   14.29%   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The primary contribution of this paper is that it identifies the importance of 
modeling investors' joint error of ignoring base rates by focusing on representative 
signals while overlooking other useful information.  Prior tests have been unable to 
detect evidence of mispricing of stock due to representativeness.  In this paper, I 
highlight the importance of empirical tests that condition upon both the information 
about fundamentals that is ignored by investors as well as the influence of overall market 
trends on investor sentiment.  The evidence indicates that representativeness-induced 
bias in stock returns is not only detectable but significantly supported by the existence of 
predictable stock return reversals in various sales growth based portfolios.  I find that 
when firms are cross-sectionally disaggregated within extreme performance categories 
based on the fundamental strength, return reversals are detected for both High and Low 
sales growth firms.  The results indicate that substantial interaction exists between 
pricing errors related to sales growth and fundamentals. 
 Furthermore, I find that when variation in investors' bias due to base rate errors is 
conditioned upon positive and negative market trends, the reversal effects become more 
pronounced.  Following positive market trends, reversals become more pronounced for 
firms in High earnings category firms and following negative market trends, reversals 
become more pronounced in Low earnings category firms.  This evidence points to 
shifting estimations on the part of investors regarding the frequency of winners and 
losers when overall trends vary in the market.  Overall, the results of this study support 
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the existence of representativeness in stock returns though I find that at least some of the 
implied mispricing for the Low earnings and Weak fundamental strength categories of 
firms may reflect a premium due to exposure to transitory liquidity factors such as price 
impact.  I also provide evidence that rejects a theory based on fixation rather than 
representativeness.                 
 The results of this paper also motivate further study of representativeness, a 
frequently studied heuristic in cognitive psychology, by finding evidence consistent with 
its effect in stock returns in the time series of stock returns.  Given the results discovered 
in this paper, I believe that investigation of representativeness merits deeper exploration 
before it is consigned as descriptively invalid as in Chan et al. (2004) when identifying 
credible explanations for anomalous stock returns.     
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